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St. Mary's Honor Center
v. Hicks
TITLE VII DOES NOT
COMPEL JUDGMENT
FOR PLAINTIFF
MERELY BECA USE
THE TRIER OF FACT
REJECTS DEFENDANT'S
REASONS FOR
AD VERSE
EMPLO YMENT DECISIONS.
Last term, the Supreme Court
provided a preview of its analysis of
disparate treatment cases when it de-
cided St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks,
113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993). In a techni-
cality based opinion delivered by Jus-
tice Scalia, the Court redefined the
meaning of pretext as it had been
traditionally used in employment dis-
crimination litigation. Instead of
merely demonstrating the falsity of
the employer's proffered reasons for
the adverse employment action, plain-
tiffs must now prove the employer's
actions were "a pretext for discrimi-
nation." Id. at 2752.
In 1978, Respondent Melvin
Hicks, an African-American, was
hired as a correctional officer by Pe-
titioner, St. Mary's Honor Center ("St.
Mary's"). In 1980, he was promoted
to a supervisory position as a shift
commander. In 1984, managerial
changes were made. In the course of
that year, Hicks was reprimanded,
suspended, demoted and ultimately
discharged. Hicks brought suit in the
United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Missouri, alleging
Title VII violations by St. Mary's for
demoting and discharging him on the
basis of race. The respondent claimed
he would prevail by simply proving
that the petitioner's justifications for
the adverse employment actions were
a pretext for discrimination.
After a full bench trial, the district
court ruled in favor of St. Mary's and
held that although Hicks' termination
may have been personally motivated
and the employer's reasons were dis-
believed, Hicks failed to demonstrate
the decision was racially based. The
United States Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit reversed and held
that once Hicks proved that all of St.
Mary's proffered reasons were
pretextual, Hicks was entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law. Id. at
2748. St. Mary's filed a petition for
certiorari, which the Supreme Court
granted. The Court reversed the Eighth
Circuit's decision and remanded the
case to the district court.
Evidentiary and procedural rules
were the guiding principles of the
Court's decision. First, the Court dis-
cussed the McDonnell Douglas re-
quirement that the defendant must
rebut the presumption of discrimina-
tion created by the plaintiff's prima
facie case. The employer accom-
plishes this by providing a legitimate,
non-discriminatory reason "which if
believed by the trier offact, would
support a finding that unlawful dis-
crimination was not the cause of the
employment action." Id. at 2747 (cit-
ing Texas Dept. of Community Af-
fairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254-
55 (1981)). Most important is the
requirement that "[t]he plaintiff bear
the ultimate burden of persuading the
trier of fact that the [employer] inten-
tionally discriminated on the basis of
race. . . ." St. Mary's Honor Ctr.,
113 S. Ct. 2742, 2747 (citingBurdine,
450 U.S. at 253).
Next, the Court explained that
judgments as a matter of law are only
awarded to plaintiffs if, "[at] the close
of the defendant's case. . . (1) any
rational person would have to find the
existence of facts constituting a prima
facie case, and (2) the defendant has
failed to meet its burden of produc-
tion. . . ." Id. at 2748. See Fed. R.
Civ. P. 50(a)(1) or 52(c). The Court
disagreed with the Eighth Circuit's
holding that a mere rejection of the
employer's justifications compelled
judgment for the plaintiff. To do so
would violate Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 301 and a Title VII requirement
that the plaintiff at all times bears the
burden of persuasion. Conversely, the
finding that Hicks was not entitled to
judgment as a matter of law was
based on St. Mary's claim that the
employee had been dismissed due to
"the severity and the accumulation of
rules violations committed by respon-
dent... ." Id. at 2747 (citing Hicks v.
St. Mary's Honor Ctr., 756 F. Supp.
30 - U. Bait. L.F. / 24.2
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1244, 1250 (1991)). The Court's
primary point of contention was that
the mere finding of pretext would
require a directed verdict for plain-
tiffs if such a high degree ofproofwas
placed upon the McDonnell Douglas
prima facie case. As a preventative
measure, the Court quickly denied
that the level of proof required to
establish a prima facie case and that
necessary to support a directed ver-
dict was on equal footing. As a result,
the Court found neither statutory,
logical nor precedential basis for the
respondent's claim. Id. at 275 1.
The most controversial segment
of the Court's ruling was its "pretext-
plus" approach to determining the
ultimate issue of intentional discrimi-
nation. Contrary to the respondent's
claim that Title VII plaintiffs need
only prove pretext to prevail, Scalia
insisted that Burdine requires that the
plaintiff show both that the employer's
justifications were false and that dis-
crimination was the true reason for
the demotion and dismissal. Id. at
2752. The Court then noted that its
decision in UnitedStates Postalerv.
Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S.
711, 714 (1983), dispelled any
"doubt" in Burdine regarding the
plaintiff's burden of persuasion.
St. Mary's Honor Ctr. at 1253. Despite
Hicks'showing that St. Mary's justi-
fications for his dismissal were un-
true, the Supreme Court found that he
failed to meet his burden of persua-
sion by showing invidious discrimi-
nation motivated the employer's deci-
Sion.
Justice Souter delivered the dis-
senting opinion with whom Justices
White, Blackmun and Stevensjoined.
The dissent chided the majority's mis-
interpretation oftheMcDonnellDou-
glas/Burdine framework by insisting
that a pretext-plus approach was in-
consistent with the Court's priorhold-
ings. Instead, the dissent asserted that
the plaintiff may meet his burden of
persuasion "either directly by per-
suading the court that a discrimina-
tory reason more likely motivated the
employer or indirectly by showing
that the employer's proffered expla-
nation is unworthy of credence." Id.
at 2760. (emphasis added) (quoting
Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256). "Unfair-
ness and impracticality" were the
dissent's major criticisms of the ma-
jority opinion. Id. at 2763. However,
the dissent was also concerned with
the Court's failure to limit the scope
of the factual determination to the
credibility ofthe employer'sjustifica-
tions.
The dissent believed the Court's
requirement ofadditional proofwou Id,
more often than not, result in sum-
mary judgment for employers. Id. at
2762. By the same token, the dissent
feared that the end result would be a
more complicated and expensive pre-
trial discovery process, longer trials,
overall delays in Title VII litigation,
and diminished judicial economy. Id.
at 2763. The dissent was equally
disturbed that the Court would hand
down a ruling so patently favorable to
employers who present "false evi-
dence in a court of law." Id. at 2763.
Consequently, the dissent believed
victims of discrimination would be
discouraged from filing claims, and
those who did would waste valuable
time and money on cases in which
they have a meager chance of win-
ning.
The St. Mary's opinion is signifi-
cant in that it reinforces the require-
ment that an employer need only pro-
vide a non-discriminatory justifica-
tion for the adverse employment deci-
sion to meet its burden of production.
At that point in the trial, theMcDonnell
Douglas/Burdine inference of dis-
crimination becomes irrelevant, and
the credibility of the proffered rea-
sons will not automatically compel a
judgment for the plaintiff. Instead, the
plaintiff must carry the ultimate bur-
den of persuasion by: 1) persuading
the trier of fact that the employer's
justifications for the adverse employ-
ment action were untruc and discrimi-
natory, and 2) persuading the trier of
fact that the plaintiff has been the
victim of intentional discrimination.
Finally, the trier of fact must decide
the ultimate question of whether the
employer intentionally discriminated
against the employee. As a result, the
decision will turn not on the truth of
the employer's justifications, but on
the plaintiff's ability to show that the
employer intentionally discriminated
on the basis of race, color, religion,
sex or national origin. In effect, the
burden of production for employers
remains minimal and the burden of
persuasion for employees is more
onerous -- making discrimination more
difficult to prove.
- Kimberley S. Wright Jones
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